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Resumo
As crises financeiras e monetárias recentes suscitaram debates com respei-
to à criação de um novo sistema financeiro internacional, a fim de aprimorar
o funcionamento dos mercados financeiros e evitar distúrbios, através de
regulações e instrumentos de supervisão em nível internacional. Neste arti-
go, apresentamos e avaliamos os mais recentes e importantes relatórios e
normas emitidas por agências multilaterais, tais quais FMI, IOSCO, Banco
Mundial, BIS e FSF. Afirmamos que, no presente, não há nenhuma potência
hegemônica capaz ou empenhada na criação de um sistema financeiro e
monetário baseado em princípios como o controle de capitais. As propostas
prevalecentes para uma arquitetura financeira têm no mercado seu instru-
mento de regulação, o que pode ser incapaz de abrandar graves crises finan-
ceiras e monetárias.
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Abstract
Recent financial and currency crises have given rise to debates regarding the
creation of a new international financial system designed to enhance the
functioning of financial markets and avoid turmoil, by improving regulations
and surveillance instruments on an international basis. In this paper, we present
and assess the latest and most important reports, standards, and guidelines
issued by multilateral agencies such as IMF, IOSCO, World Bank, BIS and FSF.
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We argue, that at present, there is no evident hegemonic power capable or willing
to impose a new international financial and monetary system based on principles
of capital controls. The prevailing proposals for a more regulated financial
architecture established a market-based approach, which may not be able to
mitigate severe financial and monetary crises.
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1 - Introduction
The financial liberalization and capital movements have had rapid growth
since the early 1970s, after the demise of the Bretton Woods system.
Consequently, the establishment of a worldwide financial integration, in a flexible
exchange rate regime, led to a notable instability on financial markets. More
recently, in the 1990s, the sequence of financial and currency crisis in emerging
economies and their contagion effects to developed countries1 gave rise to
debates regarding the creation of a new international financial system, designed
to enhance the functioning of financial markets and avoid turmoils by improving
regulations and surveillance instruments on an international basis.
In this paper we present and assess the latest and most relevant reports,
standards, and guidelines issued by multilateral agencies such as the
1
 
 For example, the bankruptcy in 1998 of the Long Term Capital Management, a hedge fund which
bet aggressively on declining spreads for emerging markets.
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International Monetafy Fund (IMF), International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), World Bank, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) and Financial Stability Forum (FSF). Our purpose is not to scrutinize
each document, since the literature is vast, but to offer an overview of the
reasoning behind the financial system reform.
However, in our opinion, to proceed with the analysis of the determinants
of the international financial system in a strict economic outlook would convey
an unsatisfactory outcome, since history and politics matter in international
economic relations. So we shall incorporate political economy’s theories, such
as the theory of hegemonic stability, in our analysis to address the development
(or not) of a new international financial architecture.
2 - What is crisis?
Economic crises can be disguised in different configurations and
extensions. They may involve overproduction and overcapacity crises, or a
slowed growth of demand that would cause a drop in the investment rate and
a fall in profits that creates pressure on inflation as means of counter-attacking
the higher production costs, which ultimately entails situations of economic
depression or stagnation. Apart from that, an economic downturn may also be
manifested in major devaluations, credit retreat, massive withdrawals and
banking bankruptcy, which keep a close relationship with currency markets
and financial sectors’ activities.
There is no broadly accepted definition on currency crises. Nevertheless,
in their very basis, there is an inner circular logic where investors flee from a
currency because they expect its devaluation, and then the resulting capital
outflows strengthen the pressure on the devaluation (Krugman, 2001). At
present, the liberalized economic environment throughout the world made the
currency markets intrinsically connected to financial markets, and so does
the crises. The link between currency and financial crisis is so strong that
some authors refer to them as twin crises (Canuto; Curado, 2001; Kaminsky;
Reinhart, 1999).
In the 1990s, different from previous currency crises, the macroeconomic
fundamentals were not unfavorable (according to first and second generation
models), for instance, the Asian crisis was not preceded by overly expansionary
policies. But currency crises are not all alike; some crises may have a
predictable component, whereas others are difficult to interpret exclusively
on the basis of fundamentals (Flood; Marion, 1998). Though, even being hard
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to indicate events that may trigger a crisis, the lack of confidence of market
agents (e.g. in a currency or in a stock price) is a common element. Thus, an
absolute uncertainty on the economy may lead to panic, and panics can quickly
shatter the confidence of market operators in the safety of cross-border
transactions, and destroy international financial markets. In particular, during
international financial crises, private financial operators tend to retreat to the
safety of domestic markets because of lesser familiarity with foreign markets,
the currency risks involved in international investment, and uncertainties
regarding the issue of how states will treat foreign assets (Helleiner, 1995,
p. 331).
The change of perceptions can be large and quick. Some currency
crises behave as a self-fulfilling prophecy. They happen to a significant extent
because lenders and investors fear they can happen, and speculate against
the exchange rate. And, once exchange rates collapse, concomitantly with an
asset deflation (in goods, properties and stock markets), the monetary
authority tends to defend its currency by raising the interest rates, which can
intensify the banking system fragility. Moreover, banking crises disrupt the
flow of credit to households and enterprises, reducing investment and
consumption, and can also force viable firms into bankruptcy. Banking crises
may also harm the functioning of the payments system, and by undermining
confidence in domestic financial institutions, they may cause a decline in
domestic savings and/or a large-scale capital outflow.
3 - Lessons from recent financial crises
The recent emphasis on asymmetric information explanations for
disturbances in financial markets is noteworthy. Traditional currency crises
models2 imply that countries experiencing an unfavorable economic situation
(high inflation rate, debt/GNP ratio or uncontrolled monetary expansion) are
more probable to suffer speculative attacks. However, this was not the case
of Asian economies on the threshold of the 1998 crisis. If financial traders
support their investment decisions on incomplete information, it is conceivable
that financial instability could strike both sound and vulnerable economies. In
such situations economic models can be deceiving, as random and
unpredictable shocks become important.
2 
 See Krugman (1979) for a first generation or canonical model or Obstfeld (1994) for a second
generation model.
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The economic stability, especially in currency markets, is strongly dependent
upon the prevailing exchange rate regime and the total foreign assets reserves.
The flexible exchange rate regime is inherently unstable, since the consequences
of a shock are hardly foreseen. Supposedly, the exchange rate would vary, in
order to automatically adjust current account imbalances, so that the
monetary values of exports and imports would always be equated. Consequently,
domestic economies would be insulated from external monetary shocks, once
the exchange rate flexibility gives the country an extra degree of freedom in
choosing its domestic macroeconomic policy mix and its own inflation-
unemployment trade-off (Walter, 1993, p. 58). In fact, there is no guarantee that
trade volumes would react quickly to changes in terms of trade in order to maintain
the long run purchasing power parity (PPP). The duration of the adjustment
process is determined by the import and export elasticity’s, which may lead to
perverse effects like the j-curve effect. Furthermore, the income elasticity’s of
demand for imports and exports themselves constrain the economic
growth rate consistent with a balance-of-payments equilibrium (McCombie, 1997;
Thirwall, 1997).
In a liberalized environment, it is likely that financial markets respond more
rapidly than goods markets to shocks, as a result, this may cause the
phenomenon of overshooting of exchange rates. Even assuming that market
participants are rational, this cannot indicate that they know the equilibrium
exchange rate. In fact, this notion can be very misleading, once
long-term fundamentals are of limited importance for market agents or, in
addition, they may have a wrong model of economic fundamentals. In the
liberalizing scenario of the post-1973 period — which must be understood in
terms of a threatened hegemony striving to maintain its monetary and financial
supremacy (Eichengreen, 2000, p. 188; Arrighi, 2003, p. 54) — the exchange
rate movements have been largely unanticipated by the market (Walter,
1993, p. 61).
On the occasion of a foreign investment, non-residents usually realize their
lack of information and thus, by being more risk averse, they are more likely to
be susceptible to changes in the host country’s economic fundamentals and
reduce both investment amount and term. Even in the absence of privileged
information, or in cases where the information is available at reasonable costs3,
the use of this information is not maximized, or properly deployed. There are
3
  Investment bank reports, technical analysis from independent consultants and balance sheets
of relevant firms are easily acquired at low costs nowadays.
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two hypothesis for this irrational behavior: (a) there are noisy traders4 who behave
in a psychological manner, taking heed of gossip and underestimating the
importance of economic fundamentals; (b) it may not be profitable to collect a
great quantity of information if the investment’s amount is quite small (Bebczuk,
2000). These issues are causes of financial vulnerabilities and pathological
behaviors5 such as asset bubbles, contagion effects and herding movements.
Calvo & Mendoza (2000) developed a model to explain the contagion effects,
which rests upon the fact that high-quality information is costly. After the
international financial liberalization, there was a significant increase in investment
options across countries, which reduced the marginal utility of acquiring veracious
information. Thus, when confronted with pessimist rumors, it is less costly to
allocate the portfolio elsewhere, than to verify the truth about a country’s
fundamentals. In the face of circumstances of a high degree of uncertainty,
Keynes’s ideas about conventional expectations, and the metaphor of the beauty
contest are still valid. Minor market participants, with little access to financial
information or reduced research activities, usually adopt a “follow the leader”
strategy pursuing the conduct of a major bank or investor. In other words, the
standard “(…) investors invariably base their decisions on the general perception
of the market, rather than on a systematic analysis of economic fundamentals”
(Griffith-Jones, 1998, p. 176).
The literature on financial crises and its contagion effects is vast.
Eichengreen, Rose & Wyplosz (1996) argue that contagion appears to spread
more easily to countries which are closely tied by international trade linkages,
than to countries in similar macroeconomic conditions. A devaluation induced
by a speculative attack increases a country’s competitiveness, but makes
the currency of its trade partners more vulnerable, due to a loss in reserves
and trade deficits — this is called a “beggar-thy-neighbor” devaluation. Drazen
(2001) presents a model that includes political aspects into the decision of
whether to defend the currency against a speculative attack or not6.
Chang & Velasco (1998) emphasize the role of liquidity in the international
system to diminish the likelihood of financial crises. They infer that a great
proportion of short-term debt over the total debt reduces the willingness of
the international financial sector to grant new finance to the debtor. For Corsetti,
4 
 This idea was firstly presented in De Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990).
5
 The study of behavioral finance addresses many of these anomalies. Cf. Thaler (1992),
Thaler and Mullainathan (2000) and Kahneman (2000).
6
 When the main objective of the policymaker is to maintain a fixed exchange rate with regard
to its “neighbors”, the devaluation in one of these countries may result in speculative pressures.
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Pesenti & Roubini (1998) the Asian crisis was the outcome of moral hazard
phenomenon that resulted in an over-borrowing process. Foreign lenders would
concede loans to households and enterprises up to the limit of sovereign
reserves7. In this scenario, unprofitable projects and monetary losses are
disregarded, and the investment is refinanced. Eventually, a refusal of foreign
lenders to continue financing cumulative losses, constrains the monetary
authority to intervene and to bail out the foreign debt stock. Therefore, the
financial crisis becomes a currency crisis once the government is impelled to
take up a monetary expansion, and then a speculative attack would occur by
way of canonical models8. The authors state that the government must warrant
the economy’s solvency by proceeding an appropriate fiscal reform.
Mishkin (2000) agrees with previously referred authors and considers
that the financial liberalization worldwide provoked an exacerbated credit
expansion, which culminated in riskier loans. This excessive risk-taking strategy
was motivated by the adverse selection issues since managers of banking
institutions are often urged to over-lend, in order to gain market shares and
reach their goals. As a further matter, in the Asian crisis, depositors and
foreign lenders to the banks in East Asia, believed that there was likely to be
government bailouts, or an external lender-of-last-resort institution to protect
them, which, in addition to an inadequate regulatory and supervisory system,
created serious moral hazard problems.
So, the unrestrained credit expansion made the firm’s balance sheets
more fragile9. As the bank’s liability deteriorates due to losses in credit
operations, it intensifies distrust in the ability of the monetary authority to
absorb such losses. Thereby, the elements of a banking crisis are all set up,
together with currency crisis caused by capital outflows. According to Mishkin
(2000, p. 18), the asymmetric information analysis of the Asian crisis
provides important lessons: (a) there is a strong rationale for an international
7 
 “Because of moral hazard banks borrowed heavily in foreign currency, and their debt position
were often short-term and unhedged, as borrowers acted on the presumption that the exchange
rates would remain stable, and they would be bailed-out if things went wrong. When indeed things
went wrong and a series of domestic and external shocks revealed the low profitability of past
investments, the shaky foundations of investment strategies in the region emerged, and currency
and financial crises appeared inextricably intertwined” (Corsetti; Pesenti; Roubini, 1998, p. 30).
8
  See Krugman (1979).
9
  Foley (2000, p. 9) developed the Hyman Minsky’s framework of financial fragility to explain
the over-borrowing process. “When interest rate policy stabilizes the growth rate, a positive
growth rate shock can set off a dynamical path that brings the economy into the ponzi regime
of financial fragility.”
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lender-of-last-resort; (b) without appropriate conditionality for this lending, the
moral hazard created by operation of an international lender-of-last-resort can
promote financial instability.
In recent cases of currency crisis10, the IMF had played a role in providing
liquidity11 to the frail countries in order to fulfill their debt service pledges to
economic power’s banks. Thus, the IMF activities must be analyzed in terms
of American interests. But then again, there is a moral hazard problem on this
external debt management. A regulation in the source country, or on an
international basis, would be necessary to avoid over-borrowing because
private rationality induces investors and creditors to persist assuming
excessive risks since they are confident in external financial assistance.
4 - Financial stability: undertaking tasks
     towards a new financial system
In the 1990s, the whirlwind in international markets led to debates about
reforming financial systems with the purpose of improving general stability
and preventing further crises. The IMF has played a central role in these
discussions, putting forward proposals for strengthening the architecture of
the international financial system. Several other agencies such as IOSCO,
World Bank, FSF and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
took part in the development of this new architecture. See tables 1 and 2 in
appendix for the recent works of these agencies pertaining to the soundness
of financial systems.
4.1 - IMF initiatives
The IMF has been issuing several documents and guidelines with regard
to financial sector reforms. One of these guidelines, titled “toward a framework
for financial stability”, listed the main principles to strengthen financial sectors
around the world and it is intended to furnish guidance for the direction in
10
 Europe in 1992, Mexico in 1994, East Asia in 1997, Russia in 1998 and Brazil in 1999.
11
 The restructuring of debt obligations is difficult to settle when the securitized exposures are
owned by a great number of investors.
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which supervisory structures and financial system reforms should progress.
Among these features, it includes transparency of the financial system,
competent management, effective risk control system, adequate capital
requirements, lender-of-last-resort facilities, prudential regulation, a
supervisory authority with sufficient autonomy and capacity, and supervision
of cross-border banking. The Fund’s work on financial restructuring has focused
on the banking system, due to its primary role as financial intermediary in
many member countries and to the limits of staff expertise (IMF, 1998).
Evidently, the IMF acknowledges the asymmetric information problems in
financial markets, which were learned from the latest crises, and it has been
chasing to overcome or diminish them through its surveillance capabilities,
improving the international regulatory framework, and spreading relevant
financial information.
The IMF is striving to improve transparency and the quality of information,
since the publication in its website of the special data dissemination standard
(SDDS) and the dissemination standard bulletin board (DSBB) in 1996. It is
also concerned with the international compatibility of reporting standards. The
logic beneath these reports is that “(…) transparency and timely release of
economic information provide the bare bones of crisis prevention”
(Griffith-Jones, 1998, p. 178). The use of financial soundness indicator (FSI)
is an attempt to enhance the data dissemination and the monitoring of financial
vulnerabilities. The IMF intends to compile and disseminate the FSI.
The Fund has strengthened its surveillance role (article IV) by examining
attentively the financial sector. One of the most important programs, the
financial sector assessment program (FSAP), started in 1999 and it has a
wide scope. The FSAP is a joint product of the IMF and the World Bank and its
principal objectives are: (a) identifying strengths, vulnerabilities and risks; (b)
ascertaining development and technical assistance needs; (c) assessing
observance and implementation of relevant international financial sector
standards, codes and guidelines; (d) making financial systems more resilient
to shocks and; (e) helping the design of appropriate policy responses. This
program consists in the analysis of financial soundness indicators
(macroeconomic factors and sectored indicators), assessment of key
supervisory standards (banking, insurance and security markets) and the
assessment of the robustness of financial sector infrastructure (payment
system design, systemic liquidity, accounting/disclosure, corporate
governance, insolvency regime and safety nets). This program comprises 14
regulatory agencies and standard setters, as the BCBS, IOSCO, International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and Financial Action Task Force
on Money Laundering (FATF), and so far have undergone about 100 economies.
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The FSAP represents a major effort to diagnose the different financial
systems in order to provide a solid basis to propose reforms and assure
financial stability of markets worldwide. The program’s cost has become
excessively high (Financial Stability Forum, 2003) but its benefits are relatively
moderate, or faintly discernible, since the financial sector assessment reports
are confidential. Certainly many contributions could have been obtained if
these documents were available for academic affairs. Even so, based on this
research, the IMF identified problems in developing countries: weak financial
institutions, inadequate bank regulations, and supervision and preferential
relationships between government, banks and corporations. We must be aware
that financial structures differ very much around the world. Looking at financial
systems across different income groups, Demirguc-Kunt & Levine (1999)
conclude that financial sector development tends to be greater at higher income
levels.
Another important report, the global financial stability report (GFSR), is
planned for publishing semiannually. “It assesses conditions and risks in
global financial markets, including emerging market financing, from a financial
market stability perspective” (Financial Stability Forum, 2003, p. 12). This
report may compile and present the FSAP major findings, although the IMF
did not manifest it. The document published in March 2003 reported that
corporate balance sheets strengthened, and that financial institutions were
showing signs of being less hesitant to take on risks. Thus, the easing of
global financial market conditions led to a reopening of capital accounts in
many emerging markets. Notwithstanding, it also stressed that an unexpected
rise in interest rates could result in high market volatility. The GFSR also
emphasized that larger local security markets could eventually provide an
alternative source of financing, and act as a buffer against changing global
financial conditions.
The IMF has also been assisting other agencies like the FATF and the
FSF in the performance of their duties. The assessments conducted by the
IMF are essential methods to assure that the recommendations of the FATF,
as well as principles of other organizations like IOSCO, IAIS and Committee
on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) are being fulfilled.
Though priority is given to crises prevention, the Fund is also remodeling
its measures of crises management. The efforts on crisis resolution are based
on a process of restructuring sovereign debt within the existing legal framework,
which includes the amendment of collective action clauses (CACs) in
international sovereign bonds. Besides this, the IMF is encouraging initiatives
aimed at formulating a voluntary code of conduct for sovereign debtors and
their creditors (Financial Stability Forum, 2003). With reference to emerging
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markets and low-income countries, the IMF claims to base its new outlook on
the Monterrey consensus (also known as the millennium development goals)
and the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP). Despite critics regarding
moral hazard issues (IMF, 2003b), the IMF admit its role as
alender-of-last-resort in some adverse situations, but it suggests that “(…)
the overall objective of Fund policy advice and financial assistance should be
to facilitate the transition, to the point where low-income members can rely
predominantly on private sources of financing” (IMF, 2003a, p. 2). Indeed,
poor countries have less mechanism to respond to the effects of external
shocks, so the IMF has an important role in the provision of financial assistance.
But the ‘rescue’ is conditioned on macroeconomic reform efforts, which can
aggravate the situation and cause severe social problems.
The Fund’s measures demonstrate a complacence to the interests of
economic powers, namely the United States12. Gowan (1999), for example,
goes further; for him, the IMF was an instrument to extend the dollar-wall
street regime13 around the world.
4.2 - Capital controls
The IMF has traditionally stressed the importance of capital account
liberalization, which major benefits would include the increase in the availability
of finance for investment and trade, the enhancements in domestic financial
system efficiency, and the diversification of risky assets. However, it admits
that if this liberalization is not done in a prudential and properly sequenced
way (IMF, 1998), the emergence of free capital movements may give rise to
potential vulnerability. Large-scale inflows, in many cases, hindered the
conduction of the domestic monetary policy and promoted pressure on
exchange rates. Thus, controls on capital inflows are emerging as a national
12
 Carvalho (2003) presents an analysis on the role of IMF on emerging markets, in special the
Brazilian case.
13
 Gowan’s ideas of an American conspiracy to destabilize East Asia’s economies seems too
unrealistic, because it would require too much coordination. For him, “(...) the US treasury was
to view the [Asian] crisis as a historic opportunity which, if seized, could transform the future
of American capitalism, anchoring its dominance into the twenty-first century” (Gowan, 1999,
p. 105). Moreover, in the Asian crisis “(…) the US government refused to take any positive
action to stabilize financial systems and currencies and kept the IMF on a leash” (Gowan,
1999, p. 106).
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level alternative to the erratic behavior of international capital14. The aim of capi-
tal regulations are: (a) to change the structure of capital inflows, increasing the
share of foreign direct investment and long-term loans; (b) to raise the autonomy
of domestic monetary policies and; (c) to restrain large over valuation of the
exchange rate, caused by sudden capital inflows. Nevertheless, capital controls
are not a straightforward solution, it may require an adequate system of
information, a regular maintenance and have inherent costs associated with it.
According to the Financial Stability Forum (2000) these costs, despite being
difficult to quantify, must be seriously taken into account once they include: (a)
the distortion of an efficient allocation of resources; (b) a postponement in the
implementation of necessary policy adjustments and; (c) opportunities for
corruption.
Chile is a case where the benefits of capital controls overcame its costs.
The Chilean authorities opted to reduce the incentives for capital inflows through
market-based regulations. They imposed an unremunerated reserve
requirement, which raised the cost of short-term external financing. Additionally,
a minimum holding period was introduced for direct and portfolio investment,
yet the regulations have been made more flexible over time. For instance,
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions and capital outflows, including
repatriation of profits, have been progressively eliminated. Even though, the
pension fund and insurance company holdings of foreign assets are still limited
(Griffith-Jones, 1998; Financial Stability Forum, 2000).
Griffith-Jones (1998) proposes the settlement of controls on an
international level. A risk-weighted cash requirement for mutual funds in source
countries, varying with macroeconomic evolution in developing countries, would
bring about an attenuation of financial flows15. However, this kind of initiatives
has not been discussed in multilateral organizations.
There is general agreement that a large surge of short-term capital flow
is endowed with tremendous volatility, which poses the risk of very sharp
reversals. Someone could point out that the solution is merely to impose
controls over capital inflows. However, regulation of short-term capital flows
are difficult to be perfectly implemented and an international effort might be
desirable since “(…) the current system provides strong regulatory
incentives towards more short-term loans, and less for long-term loans. Portfolio
14
 See Oreiro, De Paula & Silva (2003) for a Brazilian proposal for capital controls and pegged
exchange rate regimes.
15
 Another idea, that is apparently overcome, is to create a very small international tax on all
foreign exchange transactions (this was known as the Tobin tax).
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flows are at present totally unregulated by source countries” (Griffith-Jones, 1998,
p. 168).
4.3 - Capital accord
The debt crisis of 1982 engendered by Mexico’s default, and spread to
other Latin American countries, shifted the focus of banking regulators to
crisis prevention measures. The aim behind these measures was to protect
deposit insurance funds from the results of excessive risk-taking by imprudent
bank managers. However, due to capital mobility, cross-borders regulations
should be internationally standardized. In a competitive banking industry, any
cost disadvantage can narrow margins, and put a whole national financial
system in a harmful position. The discussion about over regulation, unfavorable
competition, and the soundness of financial system, embodies a myriad of
issues and interests that central banks and bank supervisors must manage.
Negotiations gathered in the BCBS achieved in 1988 a capital definition
and measurements of capital adequacy. The document titled International
Convergence of Capital Measurements and Capital Standards was designed
to (a) provide a common definition of capital, which comprised shareholder’s
equity, retained earnings, minority interests in subsidiaries, and perpetual
debt; (b) adopt a risk-weighted method to evaluate a bank’s capital adequacy;
(c) include off-balance sheet commitments in capital adequacy determination
(Kapstein, 1994). The accord is based on the notion that a large capital base
is meant to serve as a buffer to absorb losses and, therefore, provides the
institution with credibility, and its customers with confidence in the institution.
The Basel accord represented a significant step in policy convergence and
the creation of an international banking regime, with formal principles, norms,
rules and decision-making procedures. Thus, the accord would contribute to
increase the banking system’s soundness internationally.
The financial crises in the 1990s stood out flaws in the 1988 accord.
Notably, among the imperfections that we may point out, the deviating behavior
and moral hazard problems maximized by potential risk-sensitive issues,
would bear riskier activities (high-yielding loans would compensate the costs
of holding capital). Besides, short-term bank lending to the emerging markets
has been encouraged by a relatively low twenty per cent risk weight, while
bank credit to non-OECD banks with a residual maturity of over one year has
been discouraged by a hundred per cent risk weight. This has stimulated
cross-border inter-bank lending (Weder; Wedow 2002, p. 6).
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These shortcomings compelled the creation of prudent regulations and
surveillance instruments more adequate to the prevailing rationality of
globalized financial markets. “The new framework is intended to align capital
adequacy assessment more closely with the key elements of banking risks,
and to provide incentives for banks to enhance their risk measurement and
management capabilities” (Bank for International Settlements, 2001, p. 1). The
accord is structured in three pillars16 which would, together, contribute to a
higher level of safety and soundness in the financial system.
After years of negotiations, in the mid 2004 the new regulations were
eventually compiled in the new Basel accord, which is to be implemented in a
common member countries agreement by the end of 2006.
4.4 - Other principles and standards
Apart from the standard principles of banking activities and capital
definitions compiled in the Basel accord, other elements of the international
financial system, has been the focus of research on standardization principles.
A good regulatory and supervisory standard and a single definition of financial
features, such as securities and accounting, is deemed to ease efficient
comparisons of information17 and would yield to better market discipline.
The Joint Forum
The banking, insurance, and securities sectors, constitute the key parts
in a financial system. The joint forum comprises international organizations
related to each one of these sectors:
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS);
- International Association of Insurance  Supervisors (IAIS);
- International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO).
16
 I) Minimum capital requirements; II) a supervisory review process; and III) effective use of
market discipline.
17
 Bebczuk with regard to the banking sector argues that “(...) as a consequence of informational
problems, the availability of internal funds affects  the macroeconomic dynamics by broadening
the gap between the cost of external finance and the amount of firm’s funds” (Bebczuk,
2000, p. 154) thus, “(...) when informational barriers are overcome, the customer relations
create a symbiosis between the bank and the debtor” (Bebczuk, 2000, p. 165).
557
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 26, n. 1, p. 543-574, jun. 2005
Towards a new international financial system?
Each organization issued its own set of core principles, primarily designed
to set up a common framework for regulation and supervision, which would favor
the development of sectorial markets (banking, insurance and securities) around
the world.
Indeed, supervising these financial sectors is not an easy task. For
example, the use of derivatives and other off-balance sheet transactions make
banking supervision more difficult, justifying debates between the IOSCO
and the BCBS through the Joint Forum. In addition, the lines between the
sectors have become increasingly blurred with the growth of financial
conglomerates. There are banks engaging in securities activities, securities
firms selling and exchanging trading financial instruments designed to hedge
risk, and insurance companies offering savings vehicles.
Some of the similarities and differences among the core principles reflect
intrinsic characteristics of the banking, insurance, and securities sectors.
The Joint Forum decided to gather and compare theses principles and released
a report. It “(…) hopes that this analysis will help those assessing jurisdictions
against the core principles gain a familiarity with, and understanding for, the
core principles of all sectors and thus become more effective in their work”
(Bank for International Settlements, 2001b, p. 1).
Financial Stability Forum (FSF)
The FSF is another important forum for debates on the stability of the
international financial system. It brings together representatives of national
financial authorities (e.g. central banks, supervisory authorities and treasury
departments), international financial institutions, international regulatory and
supervisory groupings and committees of central bank experts. The Forum
has been complying with its mandate, that is, to: (a) assess vulnerabilities
affecting the international financial system; (b) identify and oversee action
needed to address these; and (c) improve the coordination and information
exchange among the various authorities responsible for financial stability. The
FSF does not have an authoritarian nature, but it seeks to conduct the
multilateral agenda for international financial system reforms.
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)
The FATF was formed in 1990, with the directive of issuing
recommendations to combat the misuse of financial systems by persons
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laundering drug money. In 2003, the FATF revised its forty recommendations.
They now apply not only to money laundering, but also to terrorist financing,
when combined with the eight special recommendations on terrorist financing.
These recommendations set minimum standards of action for countries to
implement the details in accordance with their particular circumstances and
constitutional frameworks (Financial Action Task Force, 2003).
This document contains, for example:
- a list of crimes that must underpin the money laundering offense;
- anti-money laundering measures for designated non-financial
businesses and professions (casinos, real estate agents, dealers of
precious metals/stones, accountants, lawyers);
- anti-money laundering requirements to cover terrorist financing;
- key institutional measures regarding international cooperation; and
- the improvement of transparency requirements through adequate and
timely information on the beneficial ownership of legal persons, such
as companies, or arrangements, such as trusts.
There has been a collaborative effort between the FATF, the United Nations
and other international organizations, to encourage all countries to implement
the recommendations.
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS)
The Committee’s objective is to analyze the international payment system,
identifying possible failures, and proposing a standard infrastructure. For
example, in the report on the role of central bank money in payment systems,
the CPSS looked at the issue of competition and cooperation between central
banks and commercial banks, and dealt with issues such as the possible
benefits and risks of the concentration of payments through a few large banks.
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB)
The standardization of accounting practices is a relevant dimension
of market discipline. The new Basel accord lists several disclosure
recommendations and accounting requirements under pillar three. Hence, the
IASB is working with the BCBS to review its disclosure standard (IAS 30) for
banks, and to promote consistency between frameworks.
In the light of crisis prevention, the great majority of the referred programs
and reports present a common aspect. They emphasize the market coordination
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on capital allocation in accordance with the prevalent regulatory governance18.
Multilateral and national organizations seek to attain the role of providing
market participants with information and transparency. The IMF’s financial
sector assessment program (FSAP), and financial soundness indicators (FSI),
and the pillar three of the new capital accord are good examples of the market
discipline reinforcements. Additionally, The disclosure of bank’s internal
information, such as risk exposure, capital adequacy and methods of
calculating capital requirements, would also provide the market with a greater
transparency. The Financial Stability Forum (2000) recommends a broad policy
of risk management strategy that involves a system for monitoring and
assessing the risks and liquidity in the economy as a whole, including at a
sectional level (banking sector, non-bank financial institutions and non-financial
institutions). The inner reasoning behind these guidelines is that information
enhances competition, so that countries, banks and other market participants
have strong incentives to present sound indicators, likewise market
capitalization, liquidity, inflation rates and debt/GNP ratio.
However, the economic logic with reference to the disclosure of financial
information is not an end in itself, consequently we may not neglect international
relation aspects, namely the geopolitical interests of economic powers (notably,
members of the Group of Seven) in the liberalization and deregulation in
emerging markets as a means to extend their zone of influence19.
5 - Is it enough? Trends and impacts
The latest activities of agencies related to functioning of the international
financial system display a general concern with the unstable environment
where different economies (from emerging markets to central economies) are
18
  “Good regulatory governance in the financial system is increasingly being recognized as key to
the achievement and preservation of financial stability. Four components have been identified
as being key to good regulatory governance. They include (i) independence of the agency from
political and industry interference; (ii) accountability; (iii) transparency; and (iv) integrity” (Das;
Quintyn, 2002, p. 48). See also, OECD (1999), for details on the rights and treatment of
shareholders, as well as the principles of disclosure and transparency.
19
 As Arrighi (2003, p. 55) put it, “(...) the United States benefited both economically and
politically as American business and governmental agencies were best positioned to mobi-
lize in the global competitive and power struggles for the cheap commodities and credit
which southern winners eagerly supplied, as well as for the assets the southern losers
had to alienate willy-nilly at bargain prices”.
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immersed in. Based on the diagnosis of recent financial/currency crises, sundry
proposals have arisen with the intention of making the financial system more
transparent, and its regulations more uniform (through the development of
principles and codes of conduct) and so, reducing information problems.
Notwithstanding, many questions still unanswered. What will be the major
impacts of these changes? Does the system become more stable with them?
Are the diagnoses correct? Is there room for thorough reforms in the
international monetary system structure?
Certainly the Basel accord of 1988 represents an important effort in
setting common rules for the banking activities. And by creating a new standard
for assessment, it made possible a market discipline. The new Basel accord
framework relies on markets and supervisors to discipline banks, and it also
enhances the importance of rating agencies in the assignment of capital
requirement weights. In the case of emerging economies, crisis events have
proven to be one of the most important determinants of sovereign ratings,
and so, even if the new Basel accord have minor effects on international loan
flows, it “(…) may lead to an increase in the volatility of international lending
to emerging markets” (Weder; Wedow, 2002, p. 24). Additionally, according to
Ward (2002, p. 2), “(…) the new accord is not, as its designers claim, suitable
for wide application (…) developing country policymakers have little choice
but to implement it in part, or in whole. Hence, there are problems of governance
in international regulation”. The BCBS is not a supranational organization. The
discussions were led by the prevailing economic powers20, in attendance of
their own interests.
Despite the efforts of the BCBS and the Joint Forum, there is no solid
standard for assessing the strength of the banking and non-banking financial
sectors. In fact, the available information can be misleading as the health of
financial institutions deteriorates in a crisis (Griffith-Jones, 1998), since "(...) a
major shock to expectation may dramatically change the very definition of
solvency" (Walter, 1993, p. 53). Therefore, the solvency problem in one market
could easily raise doubts about the solvency of others. This sort of contagion
phenomena is difficult to restrain, since there is no clear connection to economic
fundamentals.
As previously mentioned, the asymmetric information problems in financial
markets were diagnosed as a central source of instability and they would be
20
 With regard to the 1988 accord, Kapstein (1994, p. 128) argues that “(...) without the
exercise of American power, a capital adequacy accord might not have been reached  (...)
the gap between talk and action was bridged only when the United States provided the
planks”.
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damped through effective disclosure activities. The market forces would then
provide incentives for the agents to pursue sound indicators, and not behave in
an opportunistic manner. Nevertheless, the transparency and data dissemination
programs enlarged the stock of available data so much that it thwarts the
acquirement of relevant financial information and demands huge information
processing capabilities. Therefore, even with information and transparency
improvements, it is doubtful that this will lead to a better investment decision
and extinguish the threat of market overreaction. In a crisis situation, the market
(sometimes this word almost seems to have a mystical meaning) may not take
reasonable and adequate actions to soothe economic panics. In other words, it
is probable that “(…) there may not be sufficient incentives for the market to
undertake a lender of last resort role itself” (Walter, 1993, p. 53). When a large
currency crisis starts, the importance of safeguard institutions is stressed21,
and so do the harmful features of short-term capital flows.
After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, the incipient22 liberalizing
ideals spread all around. These ideals were condensed in the Washington
Consensus, which was entirely observed as a checklist by emerging
economies, with the assurance that it would attract international capital flows
and promote an economic development. The Brazilian crisis in 1999, and
Argentinean crisis in 2002 shattered the confidence in some of these
liberalization principles. Hence, in spite of various criticisms, the Bretton Woods
system remains a model for international financial stability. Griffith-Jones (1998,
p. 184) argues that “(…) there is a growing consensus — further strengthened
after the Asian crisis — that, though no panacea, discouraging short-term
flows by recipient countries is one of several useful policy instruments for
better management of capital flows and reducing the risk of currency crises”.
Some proposals23 attempt to recover some principles of this system, just as
a restriction to capital movements, the regime of fixed exchange rates, and
the scarce currency clause24.
21
 “(…) states can provide the public good of stability that the private market is unable to
provide itself” Kindleberger (1978, p. 4), Manias, Panics and Crashes: a history of financial
crises apud Helleiner (1995, p. 331).
22
 The overall globalization process was never interrupted during the Bretton Woods lifetime: there
were technological developments (specially in telecommunications); the private sector restored
its confidence in international financial transactions; multinational corporations grew fast; and
industries around the world began a pressure for deregulation (Helleiner, 1995).
23
 See, for example, Oreiro, De Paula and Silva (2003).
24
 In fact, these 3 principles had never worked harmoniously in Bretton Woods. The IMF
resources were never adequate to the necessities of balance of payments disequilibriums
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The recent reforms undertaken in the international financial system did not
truly create a new architecture. Reminiscent institutions from the Bretton Woods
system, like the IMF and the World Bank, are still operational, but they are not
performing their original responsibilities entirely. As Stiglitz asserts, “(…) building
a robust financial system is a long and difficult process. In the meantime, we
need to be realistic and recognize that developing countries have less capacity
for financial regulation and greater vulnerability to shocks”25. At present, the
monetary order, based on a flexible exchange rate regime and multi-currency
system, can be considered somehow anarchical.
5.1 - Beyond economics
Policy coordination appears to be crucial to a systemic stability. A fixed
or pegged exchange rate regime requires a coordination of economic policies
that pledges to maintain a cross-rate level. On the other hand, for the success
of a flexible exchange rate regime, the stability of market expectations is
fundamental. Policy coordination — between states too — must prevent a
major misalignment of currencies. However, this is an arduous task in an
environment of monetary decentralization, high level of financial integration,
and rapid mutations. Therefore, one of the main functions of hegemony is to
foster coordination between policies of different countries. As Charles
Kindleberger put it, “(…) for the world economy to be stabilized, there has to
be a stabilizer, one stabilizer”.26
When the hegemony’s currency becomes the key currency in the
international monetary system, as had happened to the dollar, the hegemony
is able to play a stabilizing role in the system. The hegemonic intervention is
generally associated with the establishment of a regulatory framework for
global financial transactions, which often means the encouragement of
principles of free trade and free capital movements. Another important role
that may be performed by hegemony involves the support of policy coordination
between states or even an active management of the international monetary/
   and the scarce  currency clause, design  to  punish countries that  threaten the systemic
stability, was never put into practice (Eichengreen, 2000).
25   Stiglitz, J. “The role of international financial institutions in the current global economy”
address to the Chicago council on foreign relations, 27 February 1998 apud Griffith-Jones
(1998, p. 182).
26
  Kindleberger  apud  Walter (1996, p. 128).
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/financial system. That is not to say that the presence of a hegemonic economy
is a sufficient condition to solve the issue of international financial instability.
“Economists are more often aware of the potential for financial markets to create
their own instability, leading to a need for them to be managed and regulated”
(Walter 1993, p. 79). So, perhaps only a discretionary intervention by the
government, the monetary authority or from a supranational institution can mitigate
capitalist instability, creating ceilings and floors constraining the dynamic behavior
of the system (Bellofiori; Ferri, 2001).
So, the theory of hegemonic stability provides a good standpoint for the
study of international relations, once it brings out indications of necessary
conditions for the stability of the international economic system. This theory
is sustained on a neorealistic approach27 which more recently got support
after the terroristic attacks that justified an American imposition of more rigid
trade rules to prevent bio-terrorism, and impelled the establishment of additional
recommendations from the FATF, designed to enhance the international
framework for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
Presently, the multi-currency system, constituted by the dollar, euro and
yen, reveals the multipolarity of interests in the monetary system. Even if
exchange rate stability is more likely to occur within a currency bloc, such as
the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM), this type of arrangement is
essentially volatile, because of the potential for destabilizing portfolio shifts
between key currencies. Some may state that key countries’ central banks
should coordinate their monetary policies — similarly to the Plaza accord in
1985 — pursuing a world monetary target in order to stabilize PPP prices of
internationally traded goods. But the international capital mobility causes the
money supply to become endogenous, which hinders monetary coordination
(Walter, 1993).
The conundrum of international adjustment has never been solved
throughout the years and different monetary systems. Since there was never
a world currency, historically the international liquidity was provided by the
economic powers through imports, loans, bonds and investments. And this is
one of the possible causes for the disequilibria among surplus countries and
countries showing deficits in their balance of payment, which may be harmful,
specially to small economies that need to export merchandise in order to
obtain reserves to commit to its debts and to import essential goods, like oil.
27
  “Neorealists hold that states have different policy preferences that depend upon their relative
positions in the world economy (...) The hegemony structures the system for its own benefit,
although significant benefits for other may result. The hegemony uses its power to enforce
other states’ compliance with the prevailing rules.” (Walter, 1996, p. 129).
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Who should adjust? There has always been a conflict between national autonomy
and the international stability. In Bretton Woods, Keynes proposed a collective
management of surpluses and deficits by a central bank, and an international
clearing union, which would issue the international currency, the bancor. In his
plan, both surplus and deficit countries would be sanctioned for threats to the
stability of the system. This kind of arrangement seems almost utopian, because
it involves sovereignty, geopolitical issues, and a huge transfer of resources to a
“world central bank”.
The current situation of globalization has led some authors to argue that
sovereignty is not a relevant issue anymore28. This is very debatable, since
there was no transformation of the international order (Boron, 2002), and it is
unlikely that a global government would soon emerge. Furthermore, there is
no evident global governance, even in highly globalized activities, such as
finance. The financial systems remain linked to national supervision and
regulations, and the concept of "balance of power" among states, is important to
understand the current financial architecture and to realize the potential of deeper
transformations in the system. For instance, in 1944 the American hegemony
made possible the establishment of the Bretton Wood system29. Even though
the economic powers have had a major role in the negotiations of financial
regulations, as the Basel accord, at present, there is no evident hegemonic
power capable and willing to impose a new international framework. Nevertheless,
we are not confident that a high degree of centralization would surely resolve all
difficulties, much will depend upon the policies that the dominant states in the
system would follow.
The present global balance of power is somewhat fragile. The United
States maintains its military power, but the economy is not as exuberant as it
was during the 1990s. It is facing an enormous double deficit — a fiscal deficit
of six per cent of the GDP, and a current account deficit of five per cent of the
GDP, according to the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (IMF, 2003c) — the
investment and savings rate are falling; facts that evinces the difficult economic
situation that the US must defy. China, on the other hand, is arising as an
incubating economic power. The country has the world’s largest population, it
is increasing its military capacity, and has a very dynamic economy (its
28
  For Hardt & Negri (2000), the notion of nation-state  is  not  relevant  anymore.  For  Strange
(1996), the state system has been eroded and the world economy is in operation on its own.
29
  “US dominance or hegemony was the linchpin of the successful world capitalist economy
after 1945. In the late 1940s, not only did the United States possess unrivelled power and
prestige, it also had purpose” (Walter, 1996, p. 127).
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gross domestic product, in dollars, may surpass that of the US in 2041). In 2003,
the country has also accumulated the world’s second largest foreign currency
reserve (Wolf, 2003a). The Asian countries in general, are providing the US with
goods and services in return for overpriced bonds, and as a consequence, they
are the major source of financing for America’s current account deficit.
A monetary coordination among the economic powers seems extremely
wanted and it would involve exchange rate realignments among the key
currencies of the international monetary system30. Indeed, the announcement
of the Group of Seven in Dubai, stated that more flexibility in exchange rates
is desirable in major countries or economic areas to promote smooth and
widespread adjustment in the financial system, based on market mechanisms.
But then, other questions emerge. How to proceed with these adjustments?
What is the exchange rate equilibrium level? How to restore confidence in the
American economy? Hitherto, the dollar has already been devaluated. But,
“(…) any substantial further appreciation would threaten Japan’s fragile
recovery. A big rise in the euro would also be dangerous for the Eurozone.
Moreover, a collapsing dollar would undermine foreign willingness to buy US
bonds” (Wolf, 2003b). Sudden movements of the exchange rate can also be
disastrous for China, which does not have a solid financial system yet. If a
confidence crisis starts, foreign investors may cut their holdings of US
government debt, threatening the American recovery31. In the meanwhile,
Europe is struggling to strengthen the euro. However, the vital mechanism of
the stability and growth pact — designed to enforce fiscal discipline among
member states — is not properly working32.
The lack of room for international coordination of policies in a multipolar
environment could induce debates on controls upon international capital flows,
30
 There are different points of view for a monetary coordination process. Strange (1996) developed
the theory of hegemonic mismanagement; Gowan (1999) stressed the conflictual relations in
the monetary system, given that the US would supposedly prefer disorder, rather than a stable
monetary system, and Arrighi (2003) studied the crisis of hegemony and developed the idea of
an ultra imperial management.
31
 In fact, at the beginning of 2003 a joint action between the US and Japan seemed to be
underway. The Bank of Japan carried out an unorthodox monetary policy, in other words, it was
“(...) creating money and buying US treasury bonds, which was helping to drive down US
interest rates and underwrite US economic growth — and, by extension, global growth”
(Duncan, 2004).
32
  According to the Financial Times (2003): Germany and France smashed apart the political deal
underpinning Europe’s single currency by pursuing their own strategies to reduce budget deficits.
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as a condition for stability. However, such initiative would go the other way around
the prevailing market-based approach and deregulation policies.
6 - Concluding remarks
Our intention in this paper was to argue whether the changes and
proposals undertaken by the international financial agencies would radically
transform the system and free the markets around the world from the danger
of instability. For this reason, we first addressed the problems caused by
financial crises and identified the diagnoses and lessons learned from them.
They resulted in a set of prescriptions to prevent and resolve further crises.
We then presented the main outlines of the international financial system
reform and described the role of different agencies in this process.
The presented programs and reports endeavor to create a more solid
regulation framework, and to strengthen the financial institutions, by making
them more resilient to shocks. Actually, the efforts on improving financial
transparency and data dissemination programs are valuable for diminishing
asymmetrical information problems. Hence, we cannot affirm that the reforms
are trailing a wrong course, or that they are completely ineffective in bringing
financial stability. We are merely raising objections to these programs as the
basis for a “new” international financial architecture designed to be more stable.
A simpler analysis, based solely on financial reform propositions and
principles, would convey an unsatisfactory outcome. The incorporation of
geopolitical affairs, and the examination of broader monetary system
transformation, seems to lead to wiser results. Although authors like Gowan
(1999) affirm the opposite, we argued that a hegemonic power may provide a
satisfactory environment for the establishment of ground rules, which facilitate
the operation of a particular kind of monetary adjustment mechanism. At
present, with the lack of a true hegemony, it is not likely that an organic
alteration in the monetary system can occur.
Thus far, we are not asserting that a high degree of centralization (e.g.
the creation of a world central bank) is necessary, or even desirable. First,
states and economic powers would not cede their national sovereignty to
supranational organizations, despite the European Central Bank experience.
Second, there are several complex operational issues with regard to politics.
Will the international currency be dealt by commercial banks? How would a
world central bank decide whether to provide crisis liquidity? The moral hazard
problems related to this function would persist.
567
Ensaios FEE, Porto Alegre, v. 26, n. 1, p. 543-574, jun. 2005
Towards a new international financial system?
The current international institutions may not cater to the needs of a fast
evolving financial system. Even though the IMF financing support was important
in the context of a crisis resolution, in general, the Fund has played a limited
role as an ultimate liquidity provider. In a multipolar situation, it seems even
unlikely that the market forces render adjustments to the economic system.
Appendix
Table 1  
Recent work relevant to sound financial systems — completed 
NAME AGENCY 












Principles for the Management and Supervision of Interest 
Rate Risk ………………………………………………………… 
 
BCBS 




Rating Agencies ………………………………………………… CGFS  
Role of Central Bank Money in Payment Systems …………. CPSS 
y  Market Integrity for Combating Money Laundering …………. FATF/Joint Forum 
(BCBS,IAIS,IOSCO) 
Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) …………….. FMI 
Foreign Exchange Reserve Management Guidelines ……… IMF/World Bank 
Insider Trading ………………………………………………….. IOSCO 
Transparency of Short Selling ………………………………… IOSCO 





Operational Risk Transfer ……………………………………... Joint Forum 
(BCBS,IAIS,IOSCO) 
Trends in Risk Integration and Aggregation …………………. Joint Forum 
(BCBS,IAIS,IOSCO) 
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Table 2  
Recent work relevant to sound financial systems — ongoing (up to Dec/2003) 
NAME AGENCY 
Revision of the Basel Capital Accord ………………………… BCBS 
Oversight of Payment and Settlement Systems …………..… CPSS 








Insurance Principles, Standards and Guidelines ……………. IAIS 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) …………… IMF 
Crisis Resolution ………………………………………………... IMF 
External Vulnerability Assessments ………………………….. IMF 
Financial Soundness Indicators ………………………………. IMF 
Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) ……………….…… IMF 
Offshore Financial Centre Assessments …………………….. IMF 
Transparency of IMF Policies and Assessments …………… IMF 
Bank Insolvency Initiative ……………………………………… IMF / World Bank 
External Assessments of Implementation through Reports 
on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) ……. 
 
IMF / World Bank 




Auditing Standards ……………………………………………... International 
Federation of 
Accountants (IFAC)  




Rating Agencies - Regulatory perspective …………………... IOSCO 
E-Finance and Debt Management ……………………………. OECD 
Forum for Asian Insolvency Reform ………………………..… OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance …………………………. OECD / World Bank 
Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and 
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